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Abstract
This paper examines ﬁrms’ incentives to make irreversible investments under an
open access policy with stochastically growing demand. Using a simple model, we
derive an access-to-bypass equilibrium. Analysis of the equilibrium conﬁrms that the
introduction of competition in network industries makes a ﬁrm’s incentive to make
investments greater than those of a monopolist. We then show that a change in
access charges induces a trade-oﬀ in social welfare. That is, a decrease in the access
charge expands the social beneﬁt ﬂow in the access duopoly, and deters not only
the introduction of a new network facility, but also a positive network externality
generated by the construction of an additional bypass network. The feasibility of
socially optimal investment timing is then discussed.
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Since the early 1980s, competition has been introduced in public utility industries (such
as telecommunications, natural gas and electricity) in OECD countries to increase eﬃ-
ciency and innovation. An important example of competition policy is the open access
policy, which grants entrants that do not have a network facility access to an incumbent’s
network.1 Nevertheless, these industries remain characterized by large sunk costs of in-
vestment, and increasing uncertainty in business environments. In addition, competition
lowers the expected proﬁt ﬂow from investment, so that it tends to delay investment.
Hence, the open access policy may reduce incentives for a facility-based entry.G i v e n
the potentially adverse eﬀects on incentives, the open access policy has been reconsid-
ered in some countries. For example, in 2003, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) adopted new rules concerning the network unbundling obligations of incumbent
local phone carriers, with the aim of providing incentives for carriers to invest in broad-
band.2 That is, policy makers who have recommended the introduction of competition
or open access policies are uncertain about how eﬀective competition in public utility or
network industries is in enhancing social welfare.
Note that an access charge in an open access policy is a crucial factor that aﬀects both
the proﬁto fﬁrms and social beneﬁts in network industries. However, we should not ignore
its eﬀect on the timing of investment in infrastructure in these industries, especially when
demand is expanding. In telecommunications, in addition to the traditional telephone,
several kinds of communication devices, such as mobile telephones and Internet telephony,
expand demand in the industry. For example, the annual growth rate of information
services and telecommunications industries in Japan has been around 4% since 1997,3
which suggests that more broadband networks are required. Similarly, demand for nat-
ural gas has been increased by environmental protection, which suggests greater demand
for broader gas pipeline networks in the future. With growing demand, infrastructure
1See OECD (2001) for details.
2T h en e wr u l e sd on o tr e q u i r eu n b u n d l i n go fh y b r i dl o o p sa n dﬁber-to-the-home (FTTH) loops for both
broadband and narrowband services. Michael K. Powell, the chairman of FCC, states: "Today’s decision
makes signiﬁcant strides to promote investment in advanced architecture and ﬁber by removing impeding
unbundling obligations."
3See InfoCom Research, Inc.(2003).
1investment can be stimulated by access charges or other policy instruments in an open
access environment.
This paper analyzes the competitive environment in public utility or network indus-
t r i e sb yf o c u s i n go nt h ee ﬀects of access charges on ﬁrms’ incentives to invest when there
is stochastically growing demand. We employ a real options approach to examine issues
related to investment because the industries are characterized by large sunk costs of in-
vestment and increasing demand (or cost) uncertainty. The real options approach features
irreversibility of investment under uncertainty. It highlights the option value of delaying
an investment decision. In fact, a decision on the timing of irreversible investment under
uncertainty is crucial for ﬁrms in public utility or network industries.
In particular, the real options approach is useful when a player has a sequential op-
portunity of investment timing. As is well-known, public utility industries comprise a
production facility and a network facility. (For example, in the electricity industry, a
plant for generating electricity is the production facility, whereas transmission and local
distribution wires are network facilities.) In the industries, then, an entrant or follower
has a sequential opportunity of investment timing; that of a construction of a bypass or
another network facility. This is because an important characteristic of network industries
is approval for a common use of network facilities. Since network (or essential) facilities are
characterized by large sunk costs, their common use is recommended from a social point
of view, as long as congestion problems do not occur. An entrant’s decision to construct
a bypass may be controversial with respect to improving welfare. In that case, the real
options approach is suitable for examining the properties of an entrant’s sequential invest-
ment decision (i.e., from access to bypass) because the application of a simple net present
value (NPV) approach cannot provide adequate understanding of an entrant’s incentives
to construct a bypass when there is uncertainty and investment is irreversible. With an
NPV approach, one would characterize the entrant’s decision about whether (or when) to
construct a bypass by comparing the net present value of proﬁt under access with that
under use of the bypass. However, such an approach would be inappropriate because it
ignores the option value of delaying additional investment in the bypass. This is the main
reason for adopting the real options approach to examine the incentives for investment in
2network industries. To sum up, this approach is useful for studying network industries
and, in particular, for studying the eﬀect of regulatory policies on the performance of these
industries.
Using a simple model of an option-exercise game, we examine two speciﬁc issues. The
ﬁr s ti s s u ei st h ee ﬀect of open access policy on the timing of investment or entry, while
the second is to conﬁrm its welfare implication. We then ask: can an appropriate level
of access charge achieve the socially optimal investment timing? To examine these two
issues, we ﬁrst derive an access-to-bypass equilibrium by allowing an entrant to access
an incumbent’s network facility. In particular, we characterize the entrant’s sequential
investment timing for the construction of an additional network facility, having accessed
the incumbent’s network, in terms of an access charge and the level of network investment
cost. Analysis of the equilibrium conﬁrms that the introduction of competition in network
industries makes a ﬁrm’s incentive to invest greater than that of a monopolist. That is, in
an access-to-bypass equilibrium, an open access policy leads a ﬁrm to enter earlier than
if there were no competition. This implies that an open access policy provides a strong
pre-emptive incentive to a ﬁrm, irrespective of the level of the access charge, as long as
the access-to-bypass equilibrium holds. We then show that a change in the access charge
induces a trade-oﬀ in social welfare. That is, a decrease in the access charge expands
social beneﬁt ﬂow in the access duopoly, and deters not only the introduction of a new
network facility, but also a positive network externality generated by the construction of
an additional bypass network. This trade-oﬀ occurs even when there is a usage access
charge, since the trade-oﬀ is due to its eﬀect on proﬁt ﬂows in the access duopoly. Then,
we examine the feasibility of socially optimal investment timing. We show that the use of
lump-sum subsidies or taxes in conjunction with a usage access charge not only leads to the
achievement of the desired social beneﬁt ﬂow in the access oligopoly, but it also induces
socially optimal investment timing for infrastructure construction. These policies have
recently been pursued by governments in Japan and Korea, in the form, for example, of
direct funding and tax exemptions for the construction of telecommunications broadband
infrastructure.
Many studies have addressed the access pricing problem in public utility industries
3in static economic environments. (See Armstrong (2002) for an elegant survey.) To the
best of our knowledge, only a few papers have examined the eﬀect of access pricing on the
incentive to invest in network facilities. Examples are Sidak and Spulber (1997), Gans and
Williams (1999) and Gans (2001), who considered incentives to invest in infrastructure
when there is no uncertainty. The eﬀect of uncertainty on irreversible investment has
been formally examined by Biglaiser and Riordan (2000). However, they neither analyzed
a game between an incumbent and an entrant nor allowed an entrant to construct a
bypass. Our study is the ﬁrst to analyze the investment game in public utility or network
industries by focusing on an entrant’s decision to make an additional investment in bypass
construction when there is stochastically growing demand.
In the next section, we describe the framework of a real options model for an imper-
fectly competitive network industry. In section 3, we derive the access-to-bypass equilib-
rium in which the entrant ﬁrst adopts an access strategy and then converts to a bypass
strategy. In section 4, we examine the properties of the equilibrium and achievement of
the social optimum. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
There are two risk-neutral ﬁrms, i =1 ,2, which plan to enter a network industry, such as
electricity, telecommunications or natural gas. The network industry needs two types of
facility to serve their customers: a production facility and a network facility. Each ﬁrm
has the opportunity to invest in both types of facility, and the investment decisions in
each type are assumed to be irreversible. The investment cost for the production facility
is Ie > 0, and that for the network facility is Im > 0.B o t hIe and Im are sunk costs.
Investments in the two types of facility may be undertaken simultaneously or sequen-
tially. A ﬁrm constructs the production facility at cost Ie, and at the same time or in the
next stage, the network facility is built at an additional cost of Im. However, not all ﬁrms
need to invest in the network facility, provided that at least one ﬁrm maintains the facility.
That is, the ﬁrm without a network facility may utilize the existing network facility to
distribute products. The ﬁrm that initially enters the market with both production and
4network facilities is a leader, whereas the other ﬁrm, which may or may not have a network
facility, is a follower. We assume that the follower can access the existing network facility
through a usage access charge, v>0, which is given for each ﬁrm and determined by a
policy maker.4 When the follower uses the leader’s existing network facility, the leader
incurs an access (or usage) cost for the network facility, c, which is the same as the cost of
its own production. Moreover, the follower, having access to the leader’s network facility,
may invest in the construction of its own network facility in the future. For simplicity,
production costs other than access costs are assumed to be zero.
We assume that the two ﬁrms compete in a market for a homogeneous good produced
in the network industry. The proﬁt ﬂows of the ﬁrms are uncertain because the ﬁrms
face an aggregate exogenous industry shock. The proﬁt ﬂow of a ﬁrm is represented by
π = Y Π(N),w h e r eY is the aggregate exogenous shock, N =0 ,1,2 is the number of
active ﬁrms and Π(N) is interpreted as the non-stochastic part of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt ﬂow at
the industry equilibrium.
Y evolves exogenously and stochastically according to a geometric Brownian motion,
with drift given by the following expression:
dYt = αYtdt + σYtdW,
where α ∈ (0,r) is the drift parameter measuring the expected growth rate of Y , r is
the risk-free interest rate, σ > 0 is a volatility parameter and dW is the increment of a
standard Wiener process, where dW ∼ N (0,dt).N o t et h a tα > 0 implies that the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt ﬂow π = Y Π(N) is enhanced stochastically.
A ﬁrm’s proﬁt ﬂow in the monopolistic equilibrium is represented by Y Π(1). When the
two ﬁrms are active in the market, we must distinguish between two duopolistic market
structures: ‘access duopoly’, in which the follower has access to the leader’s network
facility; and ‘bypass duopoly’, in which the follower maintains its own network facility.
Let Y ΠL (2;v) represent the proﬁt ﬂow of the leader in the access duopoly equilibrium,
4Regulated access pricing in some public utility industries is based on a two-part pricing formula (i.e.,
a usage charge and a ﬁxed charge). For analytical simplicity, we analyze only a usage charge in this paper.
See Hori and Mizuno (2003) for an analysis of a lump-sum or ﬁxed access charge.
5and let Y ΠF (2;v) represent the proﬁt ﬂow of the follower. Similarly, Y Π(2),w h i c hi s
the same for the leader and follower, represents the proﬁt ﬂow in the bypass duopoly
equilibrium.
The following relationship is assumed to hold.
Assumption 1 (i) Π(1) > Π(2) and Π(1) > Πi (2;v)( i = L,F),( i i )Π(2) ≥ ΠF (2;v),
(ii) ΠL (2;v) ≥
(<)




∂v > 0,( i v )
∂ΠF(2;v)
∂v < 0.
In (i), it is reasonable to assume that the equilibrium proﬁt Π(N) is a decreasing function
of N. The assumption of (ii) is based on the notion that additional supply of the network
facility improves the quality of goods or generates a positive network externality. For
example, a decrease in the probability of blackout may be generated by the construction
of another transmission wire in a local electricity market, or the capability to provide high
calorie gas may be due to the construction of additional gas pipelines in a gas market. In
telecommunications, the construction of another broadband cable can beneﬁt the popu-
lation of Internet users, which in turn increases the ﬁrms’ proﬁt s . N o t et h a tw ed on o t
exclude the case in which ΠL (2;v) is greater than Π(2). This occurs when the access
charge v is so high that it generates more proﬁt for a leader than is generated by a posi-
tive network externality. As shown below, there exists a unique equilibrium (on which we
focus) not only in that case, but also when the leader’s proﬁt in the access duopoly is less
than that in the bypass duopoly.
We validate Assumption 1 by using a numerical example. Suppose the inverse demand
function is linear and represented by p = a−bQ (a, b>0). Suppose also that the inverse
demand function is converted to p =( a + θ) − bQ when the market is a bypass duopoly,
where the parameter θ(> 0) represents a positive network externality. In a monopoly, a
ﬁrm chooses Q to maximize (p − c)Q,s ow eh a v eΠ(1) =
(a−c)2
4b . Similarly, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt
in a bypass duopoly under Cournot competition is given by Π(2) =
(a+θ−c)2
9b . In an access
duopoly, the leader’s proﬁti sg i v e nb y(p − c)qL+(v − c)qF, while the follower’s proﬁti s
(p − v)qF. Under Cournot competition, equilibrium proﬁts in the access duopoly are given
by ΠL (2;v)= 1
9b
h
(a + v − 2c)
2 +3( v − c)(a − 2v + c)
i
and ΠF (2;v)= 1
9b (a − 2v + c)
2.
Hence, the condition, Π(2) ≥ ΠF (2;v),r e q u i r e sv ≥ c− θ
2, which means that there exists
6a positive network externality that causes the virtual unit cost in the bypass duopoly to
be lower than that in the access duopoly by a factor of θ
2.
We restrict our attention to Markov strategies for a ﬁrm’s decision about when to
enter (or when to invest): each ﬁrm’s decision depends noly on the state variable Y .A s
an equilibrium concept fro the game, we use a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The follower has three possible strategies. First, the follower may want access to the
network facility constructed by the leader forever to save on investment costs, Im. Second,
the follower may want to construct its own network facility to save on an access payment.
Another possibility is that the follower initially has access to the leader’s network facility,
but then decides to construct its own network facility.5 We refer to these three alter-
n a t i v e sa st h e‘ access strategy’, the ‘bypass strategy’a n dt h e‘ access-to-bypass strategy’,
respectively. The preference of the follower may depend on the conditions relating to the
level of investment costs, the equilibrium proﬁt under product market competition, the
level of the access charge, and so on. In the next section, we examine the follower’s choice
of strategy before deriving the equilibrium of the game.
3 The Access-to-Bypass Equilibrium
We derive the equilibria of the game described in section 2.
3.1 The follower’s choice of strategy
First, we must consider the follower’s strategy choice when the follower is allowed to not
only have access to the leader’s network facility, but also to construct its own network
facility. As mentioned in the previous section, in this environment, the follower has three
alternative strategies: the access strategy, the bypass strategy and the access-to-bypass
strategy. We ask the question, under what conditions does the follower choose one strategy
over the others? We note that the follower’s choice can only be appropriately determined
by the real options approach under irreversible investment and uncertainty. The stan-
5Yet another possibility is that the follower ﬁrst constructs its own network plant and then uses the
leader’s plant by paying an access charge. However, we can ignore this possibility because network invest-
ment and the access payment are irreversible.
7dard net present value approach ignores the option value of waiting generated by the
irreversibility of the two types of investment that the follower can make.
To answer the question, we ﬁrst derive the value of each project before obtaining the
values of the three strategies.
When the access project is undertaken, its value is:




When the bypass project is undertaken, the value of the project is:




Using (1) and (2), we can deﬁne the value of the transition project, ∆V (Y ),w h i c hi st h e
diﬀerence between the values of the bypass project and the access project:




where ∆Π(2;v) ≡ Π(2)−ΠF (2;v) is referred to as the incremental proﬁt ﬂow from access
to bypass.
Suppose that the bypass project is undertaken. Then, there must be a trigger point
Y B∗, at which the bypass project begins. Deﬁning the option value of the transition project








Next, we derive the trigger point Y A∗ at which the access project begins. Note that,
when the bypass project is allowed, the eﬀective value of the access project includes not
only its own project value, but also the option value of the transition project. Hence,
deﬁning the option value of the access project and using the value-matching and smooth-
6The derivation follows a standard technique in the real options literature. See Dixit and Pindyck
(1994).







From (4) and (5), an increase in uncertainty deters not only the follower’s entry
by access, but also its construction of a bypass facility. That is, ∂Y A∗/∂σ > 0 and
∂Y B∗/∂σ > 0,s i n c eβ1 is a decreasing function of the volatility parameter σ.8
The derivation clariﬁes which strategy is adopted by the follower. When Y B∗ < +∞
and (0 <)Y A∗ ≤ Y B∗, the follower adopts the access-to-bypass strategy. When Y B∗ =
+∞ and Y A∗ (> 0), the follower adopts the access strategy. When Y B∗ <Y A∗,t h e
follower adopts the bypass strategy. The following lemma states the conditions under
which each strategy is adopted by the follower.
Lemma 1 Under ∆Π(2;v) > 0 of Assumption 1(i), the follower adopts the access-to-









When an incremental proﬁt ﬂow from access to bypass is positive, i.e., when ∆Π(2;v) >
0, the access strategy is not adopted by the follower. This is because the aggregate shock
Y evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion such that it has the expected growth
rate αThe condition (6) deﬁnes a hyper-plane that separates the access-to-bypass strategy
and the bypass strategy.
[Insert Figure 1]
7We can ensure that the trigger point Y
A∗ is the same when the bypass construction is not allowed,
which means that the option value of the transition project does not aﬀect the trigger point for the access
project Y
A∗. This is because the option to enter the market by access includes the option value of the
transition project. In fact, the option value of the transition project is canceled out in the process of
deriving Y
A∗:
8See pp.143-144 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for the eﬀect of σ on β1.
9Figure 1 illustrates the follower’s choice of strategy in terms of the access charge v and
the investment cost for the network facility Im. In Figure 1, the follower adopts the access-
to-bypass strategy in the region above the hyper-plane Im = Ψ(v), which is an explicit





ΠF (2;v).9 Otherwise, the follower adopts
the bypass strategy. The division of the regions is intuitive. When the investment cost
for the network facility is higher than the access payment, the follower initially accesses
the incumbent’s network and then constructs its own network facility.
3.2 The equilibrium
In this subsection, we focus on the case in which the follower adopts the access-to-bypass
strategy. We do so because this is a general case in the sense that it includes two actions
of the follower and shows some peculiar characteristics of network industries.
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if Y < Y A∗
Y ΠF(2;v)








if Y A∗ ≤ Y< Y B∗
Y Π(2)
r−α − (Ie + Im) if Y B∗ ≤ Y
(7)
The trigger points Y A∗ > 0 and Y B∗ > 0 are (5) and (4), respectively.
Next, we consider the leader’s value function when the follower adopts the access-to-
9It is easy to verify that Ψ
0 (v) > 0.As u ﬃcient condition for Ψ”(v) > 0 is
∂2ΠF (2;v)
∂v2 ≤ 0.
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r−α − (Ie + Im)
if Y A∗ ≤ Y< Y B∗
Y Π(2)
r−α − (Ie + Im) if Y B∗ ≤ Y
(8)
[Insert Figure 2]
Let us focus on the asymmetric leader-follower equilibrium, which we refer to as the
‘access-to-bypass equilibrium’. To guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the equi-








and that the diﬀerence
between the leader’s value and the follower’s value decreases monotonically. The suﬃcient
condition for the existence and uniqueness of the access-to-bypass equilibrium are derived
in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix. Although the condition is complicated, sets
of numerical values that satisfy the condition are easily found. Figure 2 shows the region
in which the suﬃcient condition holds when β1 =2 . The horizontal axis represents x ≡
ΠL(2;v)−ΠF(2;v)







.W h e nβ1 =2 ,t h e
suﬃcient condition holds in the shaded region deﬁned by
n











Ie and ΠL (2;v) − 2ΠF (2;v)=3 Π(2), the access-
to-bypass equilibrium is unique. This set of numerical examples indicates that, when the
investment cost for the network facility is small relative to the cost for the production
facility and when the access charge is suﬃciently high that it oﬀsets the beneﬁt generated
by a positive network externality for the leader, there exists a unique equilibrium in which
the follower enters the market by access and then builds its own bypass facility in the
future. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique access-to-bypass equilibrium in which the leader’s
11trigger point Y AB
L is characterized by
V AB
L (Y ) <V AB
F (Y ) if Y < Y ∗
L
V AB
L (Y )=V AB
F (Y ) if Y = Y ∗
L
V AB
L (Y ) >V AB





L (Y )=V AB
F (Y ) if Y ≥ Y B∗,


























where ΠLF (2;v) ≡ ΠL (2;v) − ΠF (2;v).
Proof. See Appendix.
[Insert Figure 3]
Figure 3 shows the access-to-bypass equilibrium. For Y ∈ [0,Y∗
L) where Y ∗
L is the













, the follower constructs its
own network facility.
4 Properties of the Equilibrium
4.1 The eﬀect of competition
Using a real options approach, and comparing the optimal strategy of a monopolist with
the optimal strategy of a leader in duopoly, Nielsen (2002) showed that, even with irre-
versible investment and uncertainty, competition induces ﬁrms to invest earlier. We can
extend this result to the access-to-bypass equilibrium derived in the previous section.







(Ie + Im). (10)
We then derive the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The leader in an access-to-bypass equilibrium enters the market earlier
than a monopolist.
Proof. See appendix.
To prove Proposition 2, we show in the Appendix that V AB
L (Y ∗) >VAB
F (Y ∗) for Y ∈
¡
0,YA∗¢








, which guarantees the existence
and uniqueness of the access-to-bypass equilibrium, plays a crucial role in the proof of the
proposition. For the condition to be satisﬁed, as we explained before stating Proposition
1, the access charge v must exceed the access cost c, or the investment cost for the network





, which means that both ﬁrms have strong pre-emptive incentives under
competition.
The meaning of this result warrants a detailed explanation. Note that the introduction
of competition reduces a ﬁrm’s proﬁt ﬂow, i.e., from Π(1) to Πi (2;v)( i = L,F),w h i c h
lowers a ﬁrm’s incentive to enter. In a real options approach, the eﬀect of the decrease in
proﬁt ﬂow on the timing of entry is more severe than in an NPV approach. This is because
the option value of waiting is due to irreversible investment and uncertainty, which should
be added to the net present value of proﬁt.10 However, each ﬁrm has a strategic motive to
extract a monopoly rent, i.e., it has a pre-emptive incentive. Hence, the result implies that
the pre-emptive incentive for being a leader dominates the eﬀect of a decrease in the proﬁt
ﬂow, even if the option value of waiting is realized. This pre-emptive-incentive-domination
eﬀect was also found by Nielsen (2002). We extend his result to an open access competitive
environment.11
10This point is made by the formula for the trigger point (e.g., Y
∗) by the multiplication of
β1
β1−1 (> 1).
11Grenadier (2002) also emphasized the impact of competition on an exercise strategy of investment in
an N-player Cournot-Nash competition.
13Furthermore, the follower in the access-to-bypass equilibrium might also enter the
market earlier than a monopolist.





ΠF (2;v), the follower in the access-to-bypass equi-
librium enters the market earlier than a monopolist.
Proof. Comparing Y A∗ with Y ∗ proves this point.
Note that, even when the follower’s proﬁt ﬂow under access duopoly is less than that of
a monopolist (i.e., ΠF (2;v) < Π(1)) as stated in Assumption 1(i), the follower may enter
the market earlier than a monopolist. This is because the follower is allowed to access the
leader’s network facility by paying an access charge v. In fact, this can be the case when the
investment cost for a network facility is small relative to the cost of a production facility,
and when the follower’s proﬁt is not too small. For example, for β1 =2 , under a set of
©
Im =0 .5Ie, ΠF (2;v)=0 .7Π(1), Π(2) = 2.8
3 Π(1)
ª
, which guarantees the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium, the follower enters the market earlier than a monopolist.
4.2 The eﬀect of the access charge
In the previous subsection, we showed that the introduction of competition makes the
leader enter earlier than a monopolist even when there is irreversible investment under
uncertainty. However, the access charge also aﬀects the ﬁrm’s incentive to enter an open-
access competitive environment. We examine the eﬀect of the access charge on the trigger
points in the access-to-bypass equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (i) ∂Y ∗
L/∂v<0, (ii) ∂Y A∗/∂v>0, (iii) ∂Y B∗/∂v<0.
Proof. See Appendix.
From Proposition 3, a unit access charge can aﬀect the investment timing of ﬁrms.
In particular, a decrease in the unit access charge can induce the follower to enter the
market early through access and construct its bypass facility late, and induces the leader
to enter late. That is, in the access-to-bypass equilibrium, a change in the access charge
has a positive eﬀect on the follower’s entry with access, but has a negative eﬀect on the
leader’s entry and the introduction of bypass construction.
14The result and its welfare implications are intuitive. When the access charge decreases,
consumers cannot be served early through the construction of a new network facility by a
leader (such as a new broadband cable in a rural area) and neither can they enjoy positive
network externalities early. However, they can enjoy a longer access duopoly equilibrium
in which social welfare is higher than in a monopoly equilibrium. In addition, a decrease
in the unit access charge increases the social beneﬁt ﬂow itself in the access duopoly
equilibrium. Therefore, there is a trade-oﬀ in the policy of changing the access charge,
which gives rise to a dilemma for a policy maker.
4.3 The feasibility of optimal investment timing
In this subsection, we compare investment timing in the access-to-bypass equilibrium with
socially optimal investment timing.
To examine this issue, we need to deﬁne the social optimum in our model. Bearing
in mind the open access policy, we ignore the case in which a regulator can control the
retail price. We represent the consumer surplus ﬂow (excluding the random term) by S(.)
and the social beneﬁt ﬂow (excluding the random term) by SB(.). Recall that the unit
access charge v aﬀects not only ﬁrms’ investment timing, but also the social beneﬁt ﬂow
under the access duopoly in the access-to-bypass equilibrium. In addition, several types
of market structure sequences may be socially optimal in an expanding economy. This
depends on the level of social beneﬁt ﬂow in each market equilibrium, the parameters of
the geometric Brownian motion and levels of investment costs.
However, in an expanding economy, it is reasonable and useful to focus on the case
in which the social optimum is the environment that has the same sequence of market
structures (i.e., the monopoly, the access duopoly and the bypass duopoly) as has the
a c c e s s - t o - b y p a s se q u i l i b r i u m .T h i si sj u s t i ﬁed by the following argument. When demand
is low and a ﬁrm’s proﬁt ﬂow is small, the (natural) monopoly may be desirable since
the duplication of sunk investment for both production and network facilities would be
wasteful, even if the social beneﬁt ﬂow in a monopoly equilibrium is small. When demand
increases, the duopoly is desirable. Then, which type of duopoly is desirable depends on
the magnitude of the positive network externality generated by construction of the bypass.
15Suppose the social beneﬁt ﬂow induced by the positive network externality from the bypass
construction exceeds that under an access duopoly in which the unit access charge is set
so low that it induces the socially optimal retail price (as long as the ﬁrm’s feasibility (or
non-negative proﬁt) condition is met). Then, it is desirable that the access duopoly is
followed by the bypass duopoly from a welfare point of view in an expanding economy.
Hence, we limit our attention to the case in which the social optimum in an open-access
competitive environment is the one that has the same sequence of market structures as
has the access-to-bypass strategy equilibrium. The following assumption guarantees the
existence of the social optimum.
Assumption 2 (i) SB(1) <S B ∗∗
v (2) <S B(2),( i i )
∆SB(2)
SB∗∗






where SB(1) ≡ S (1) + Π(1), SB∗∗
v (2) ≡ S∗∗
v (2) + ΠL∗∗
v (2) + ΠF∗∗
v (2), SB(2) ≡ S (2) +
2Π(2) and ∆SB(2) ≡ SB(2) − SB∗∗
v (2). Here, SB∗∗
v (2) is deﬁned as the maximized
social beneﬁt ﬂow achieved by a regulator who controls access pricing under the access
duopoly, i.e., the social beneﬁt ﬂow in the access duopoly in which the unit access charge
is so low that it induces the socially optimal retail price as long as the ﬁrm’s feasibility
condition is met.12 (S∗∗
v (2), ΠL∗∗
v (2) and ΠF∗∗
v (2) are the associated consumer surplus
and the ﬁrms’ proﬁt ﬂows, respectively.) Assumption 2(i) states that the social beneﬁt ﬂow
in the monopoly market is less than that in the access duopoly, which in turn is less than
that in the bypass duopoly. Assumption 2(ii) guarantees the existence and uniqueness
of the social optimum in which the same sequence of market structures as those in the
access-to-bypass equilibrium prevails according to the development of Y . In particular,
this assumption guarantees that the trigger point of the monopoly project is below that
of the access project, which in turn is below that of the bypass project.
Let us derive the socially optimal investment timing for the construction of each facility.
The procedure used is the same as that used to derive the ﬁrm’s optimal investment timing
except that the social beneﬁt ﬂow SB(.) is used instead of the proﬁt ﬂow. Hence, we report
only the value of the social beneﬁt at the social optimum, which is given by:
12See Armstrong and Vickers (1998) and Lewis and Sappington (1999) for an optimal access charge with
an unregulated retail price.
16V ∗∗ (Y )=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
H1Y β1
YSB(1)
r−α + GY β1 − (Ie + Im)
YSB ∗∗
v (2)
r−α + F1Y β1 − (2Ie + Im)
YSB(2)








L ≤ Y< Y A∗∗
Y A∗∗ ≤ Y< Y B∗∗







































Comparing the trigger points in the access-to-bypass equilibrium with those in the
social optimum yields the welfare implications of the equilibrium investment timing. First,
Y B∗∗ <YB∗ as long as ∆SB(2) > ∆Π(2;v). This is because the follower is not concerned
about a change in the consumer surplus or the leader’s proﬁt ﬂow. If a positive network
externality induces a higher increase in social beneﬁt under bypass than does an increase in
follower’s proﬁt ﬂow, the timing of the social bypass is earlier than that of the equilibrium.
Similarly, we can compare Y A∗ with Y A∗∗,o rY ∗
L with Y ∗∗
L . However, since the results
depend not only on the level of the access charge, but also on the parameters representing
the economic environment (such as demand and costs), the derivation of interesting welfare
implications is too complex. Hence, rather than compare the timing of investment, we
examine the feasibility of the socially optimal investment timing in the access-to-bypass
equilibrium.
By comparing with the trigger points in the access-to-bypass equilibrium, it is easy to
verify that only the usage access charge v as a policy variable cannot generically induce
socially optimal investment timing, Y ∗∗
L , Y A∗∗,a n dY B∗∗. This result contrasts with that
17of Gans (2001). In his paper, a two-part (i.e., lump-sum plus usage) access charge can
achieve the optimal timing of infrastructure investment in the absence of uncertainty,
as long as the ﬁrm’s feasibility requirement is not violated. Optimal investment timing
cannot be determined in our model, even if the two-part structure of access pricing is
assumed, for the following reasons. First, we assume growing demand in addition to the
positive network eﬀect generated by construction of the bypass, whereas Gans (2001)
assumed a stationary economic environment, which explains why one of the two regimes
(access or bypass) is socially preferred under a duopoly in his model. Second, since in
his paper the follower is not required to invest in a production facility to enter a market
through access, the follower must gain access as soon as possible from a welfare point of
view. This second point is crucial in deriving the social optimum by controlling the access
charge in his paper. By contrast, in our model, the follower must undertake irreversible
investment in its own production facility. Furthermore, the trigger point for construction
of the bypass is also aﬀected by the access charge. Therefore, only the usage access charge
v as a policy variable cannot generically induce socially optimal investment timing, Y ∗∗
L ,
Y A∗∗,a n dY B∗∗.
However, as stated in the following proposition, socially optimal investment timing
can be achieved if lump-sum subsidies (and taxes), as well as the usage access charge, are
introduced.
Proposition 4 The social optimum can be achieved by the following regulatory policy.
For the follower: (i) the usage access charge v∗∗ is such that SB(2;v∗∗)=SB∗∗
v (2)
¡
≡ S (2;v∗∗)+ΠL (2;v∗∗)+ΠF (2;v∗∗)
¢
, and the lump-sum subsidy TA∗∗ in the access








TB∗∗ =[ SB(2) − Π(2)] − SB(1).
For the leader: (i) the lump-sum subsidy TB∗∗ in the bypass duopoly, and the lump-sum
tax T∗∗
L in the monopoly are such that:14
13Note that T
A∗∗ or T
B∗∗ can be negative, in which case, a lump-sum tax is applied.














































− (Ie + Im) (15)
Proof. See Appendix.
The premise for achievement of the social optimum is as follows. The optimal social
beneﬁt ﬂow under the access duopoly can be manipulated only by the usage access charge,
which means that v∗∗ has a role in achieving the optimal social beneﬁt ﬂow under the access
duopoly. Hence, setting v∗∗ disrupts a ﬁrm’s investment timing. To adjust the timing,
disrupted by v∗∗, to the socially optimal timing requires lump-sum subsidies and taxes.
Note that, while the role of the usage access charge v∗∗ is familiar, the role of lump-
sum subsidies or taxes diﬀers from its role in the literature that focuses on static analysis.
Lump-sum subsidies and taxes are usually used to meet ﬁrms’ feasibility requirements. In
our model, they are needed to correct investment timing, which is aﬀected by the usage
access charge v∗∗. In particular, the magnitudes of TA∗∗ and TB∗∗ are intuitive. They
represent shortages of social beneﬁts that are ignored by the follower when the market
structure changes from monopoly to duopoly. Note that both TA∗∗ and TB∗∗ are expressed
in terms of ﬂow variables, whereas T∗∗
L is expressed as a stock variable. Note also that
TA∗∗, TB∗∗ and T∗∗
L can be negative, and so policy makers need detailed information on
the environment to determine them.
In practice, similar policies that perform the role of these subsidies and tax beneﬁts are
pursued. In telecommunications in Japan, under the e-Japan plan, Japanese governments
have provided funds of up to 50% (25% from central government and 25% from local
government) for infrastructure cost (cable, equipment and installation) to NTT/cable
TV operators using FTTH or Hybrid networks. Similarly, in South Korea, the Korean
19Information Infrastructure (KII) strategy included the construction of new high capacity
backbone infrastructure with more than US$1.5 billion of direct government funding.15
These policies should be accompanied by an appropriate usage access charge that induces
the optimal social beneﬁt ﬂow in access duopoly.
It should be noted also that, instead of the lump-sum subsidy TA∗∗, we could introduce
a lump-sum access charge, in the form of a two-part tariﬀ. However, the introduction of a
lump-sum access charge generates a suspension value in a stochastic environment, which
complicates the analysis. (See Hori and Mizuno (2003) for an analysis of lump-sum access
charges.) To avoid unnecessary complexity, we introduced TA∗∗. If we had used the two-
part tariﬀ structure for access pricing, an adjustment for suspension value would have
been required to the subsidy TB∗∗ and the tax T∗∗
L .
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we have investigated the eﬀects of access charges on ﬁrms’ incentives to
invest in network public-utility industries when investment is irreversible and there is
uncertainty. Since the industries are characterized by large sunk costs for investment with
stochastically growing demand, we employed a real options approach to examine some
policy issues in an open-access competitive environment.
U s i n gas i m p l em o d e l ,w ed e r i v e da naccess-to-bypass equilibrium by allowing an en-
trant the opportunity to access an incumbent’s network facility. In particular, we char-
acterized an entrant’s sequential investment timing for the construction of an additional
network facility, having accessed the incumbent’s network, in terms of an access charge
and the level of network investment costs. Analysis of the equilibrium conﬁrmed that the
introduction of competition in network industries makes a ﬁrm’s incentive to invest greater
than that of a monopolist. That is, in an access-to-bypass equilibrium, a ﬁrm enters earlier
in an open access policy if there is competition. We then showed that a change in the
access charge induces a trade-oﬀ in social welfare. That is, a decrease in the access charge
expands social beneﬁt ﬂow in the access duopoly equilibrium, and deters the introduction
15See Broadband Stakeholder Group (2003) for international experience of funding investment in next-
generation broadband.
20of a new network facility and a positive network externality generated by the construction
of an additional bypass network. This trade-oﬀ occurs even when there is only a usage
access charge through its eﬀect on proﬁt ﬂows in the access duopoly equilibrium. We
also examined the feasibility of socially optimal investment timing. We showed that, if
lump-sum subsidies or taxes can be used with a usage access charge, the desired social
beneﬁt ﬂow and socially optimal investment timing for infrastructure construction can be
achieved in access oligopoly. These policies have recently been applied in practice. For
example, the governments of Japan and Korea have introduced direct government funding
and tax exemptions for the construction of telecommunications broadband infrastructure.
One may argue that the regulatory policy that we introduced in this paper is unrealistic
because it uses a usage access charge and lump-sum subsidies and taxes. However, other
regulatory policies could be used to achieve the optimal investment timing. For example,
if the access charge depends on the state, such as v(Y ), it may be possible to achieve
the optimum. However, in that case, ﬁrms’ proﬁts would be non-linear functions of Y ,
which would complicate the analysis. In addition, voluntary agreements on access charges
between network providers and access seekers may induce an approximate social optimum.
The search for policy tools that will achieve the social optimum is an important issue for
future research.
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
First, it is easily shown that the follower does not adopt the access strategy. This is
because the access project is not converted to the bypass project if and only if the net
value of the transition project is non-positive, i.e., ∆V (Y )−Im ≤ 0 for ∀Y . However, when
∆Π(2;v) > 0, there exists Y such that the condition for ∆V (Y )−Im =
Y ∆Π(2;v)
r−α −Im > 0
holds for Y ≥ Y .
Next, observe that, when Y B∗ < +∞ and (0 <)Y A∗ ≤ Y B∗, the follower adopts the
access-to-bypass strategy. When Y B∗ <YA∗, the follower adopts the bypass strategy. In
fact, using (4) and (5), the condition that Y A∗ ≤ (>)Y B∗ is rewritten as (6). ¥
21P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Since we have already derived the value function of the leader and that of the follower, the
characteristics of which are standard in the real options literature, it is enough to show a
suﬃcient condition for the existence and uniqueness of the access-to-bypass equilibrium.
As stated in the text, to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, it is








and that the diﬀerence between the
leader’s value and the follower’s value decreases monotonically.
Let us deﬁne QAB (Y ) ≡ V AB
L (Y ) − V AB




and (8) into V AB
L (Y ) and V AB















































For QAB0 (Y ) < 0 for Y ∈
£
Y A∗,YB∗¢
, it is necessary that Im <
Y B∗ΠLF(2;v)
r−α ,w h i c h
implies that QAB”(Y ) < 0 (i.e., QAB (Y ) is not smooth at Y = Y B∗). For QAB (Y ) to be
monotonically decreasing in Y , we require that QAB0 ¡
Y A∗¢
< 0. Inserting Y A∗ and Y B∗
into QAB0 ¡
Y A∗¢
< 0,w eh a v e
ΠLF (2;v)
∆Π(2;v)


















∆Π(2;v) by the condition that Im <
Y B∗ΠLF(2;v)
r−α .
In addition, the condition that QAB ¡
Y A∗¢





















22Note that the right-hand side of (20) must be negative. Combining (19) and (20) and



























P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
We deﬁne PAB (Y ) ≡ V AB
L (Y ) − V AB
F (Y ) at Y
¡
<YA∗¢
. To prove the proposition, we
































where ΠLF (2;v) ≡ ΠL (2;v) − ΠF (2;v).
































We deﬁne a ≡ Im
Ie , b ≡
ΠF(2;v)
Π(1) , d ≡
ΠL(2;v)
ΠF(2;v),a n de ≡
Π(2)
Π(1),w h e r eb ∈ (0, 1) and































Observe that the existence and uniqueness of the access-to-bypass equilibrium is guar-








. Using the above notation, the






















(d − 1). (25)
Multiplying both sides of (25) by (b(1 + a))


























(1 + a)+( b(1 + a))
β1
∙







To ensure that PAB (Y ∗) > 0,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that χ(a,b,β1) ≥ 0.T o s h o w
that χ(a,b,β1) ≥ 0,w ee x a m i n et w oc a s e sa c c o r d i n gt ot h ev a l u eo fb(1 + a).
Case 1:
When b(1 + a) ≥
β1
β1−1,i ti so b v i o u st h a tχ(a,b,β1) > 0.
Case 2:
L e tu se x a m i n et h ec a s ei nw h i c hb(1 + a) <
β1
























β1−1 (b(1 + a))
β1−1
i
. Hence, the sign of χ(a,b,β1)
is equal to that of e χ. Let us deﬁne x ≡ β1 − 1 and γ ≡ b(1 + a). Then, we have
e χ(γ,x)=xγx+1 − (x +1 )γx +1 . (29)
Here,
∂h χ
∂γ = x(x +1 )γx−1 (γ − 1),s ot h a t
∂h χ
∂γ ≥ (<)0i fa n do n l yi fγ ≥ (<)1. This means
that e χ(x,γ) takes its minimum value at γ =1 ,g i v e na n yx>0. In fact,
e χ(1,x)=x − (x +1 )+1=0 . (30)
Note that this does not depend on the level of x.T h a t i s , f o r a l l x>0, e χ(γ,x) ≥ 0.
Therefore, χ(a,b,β1) ≥ 0, which in turn implies PAB (Y ∗) > 0. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
First, let us prove (i). Remember that Y ∗











L − BL (Y ∗
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Y B∗¢β1.D i ﬀerentiating this, we have
CdY ∗
L +




β1 dv =0 , (32)




L) < 0. Substituting (5) and (4) into Y A∗ in BF and Y B∗
in BL, respectively, and diﬀerentiating, we have
∂ (BF + BL)
∂v
































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4




as in the proposition. The optimal social beneﬁt ﬂow under the access duopoly can be
manipulated only by a usage access charge v,s ot h a tv∗∗ should be characterized by
SB∗∗
v (2) = SB(2;v∗∗). Substituting these into the project values of (1) to (3), we derive










∆Π(2;v∗∗)+[ TB∗∗ − TA∗∗]
Im. (35)
Comparing (13) with (34) reveals that TA∗∗ =
£
SB∗∗
v (2) − ΠF∗∗
v (2)
¤
− SB(1),w h i c h
makes Y A∗ equal to Y A∗∗. Similarly, we get TB∗∗ =[ SB(2) − Π(2)] − SB(1) by substi-
tuting TA∗∗ into (35) and comparing it with (14).
Since the leader’s trigger point Y ∗












L is obtained by solving the equation after the substitution of
Y A∗∗, Y B∗∗, v∗∗, TA∗∗ and TB∗∗. In addition, for V AB
F ≤ V AB
L for all Y , TB∗∗ is required
for the leader in the bypass duopoly. ¥
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